Mitigating panic buying behavior in the epidemic: An evolutionary game perspective

The panic buying behavior under public health emergencies will lead to many adverse consequences, such as material waste, price fluctuation and uneven distribution of epidemic prevention materials, which will pose a threat to the social stability and economic development. In this paper, we construct a tripartite game model to explore the strategic choices of the public, merchants and the government in order to effectively respond to the panic buying behavior in the epidemic. The results demonstrate that: (1) Eight evolutionary stable strategies emerge in the panic buying events. The worst scenario can be improved by adjusting some relevant parameters. (2) The probability of the public choosing the strategy of “not involving in panic buying” depends on the potential benefits and losses of snapping up, rather than the extent of price rising. (3) The probability of merchants choosing the strategy of “not bid up price” depends on the intangible benefits. (4) The probability of the government choosing the strategy of “active supervision” depends on the supervision costs and government credibility, rather than the amount of fines. In addition, strategic suggestions to mitigate panic buying behavior are put forward from the perspective of each stakeholder.     

抵押物处置与农房抵押贷款困境：基于演化博弈的分析

研究目的:分析农民住房财产权抵押(简称农房抵押)贷款困境的主要原因以及抵押物处置对农房抵押贷款行为的影响机理。研究方法:演化博弈论。研究结果:农房抵押贷款发展面临困境的关键在于金融机构惜贷,而抵押物处置难是激发金融机构惜贷的重要原因,但是降低抵押物处置难度只是推动农房抵押贷款发展的必要而非充分条件。研究结论:要促进农房抵押贷款发展,除了必须降低抵押物处置难度外,还需要构建完善的农房抵押贷款制度体系。     

基于系统动力学的区域林业碳汇市场中三方主体利益行为演化博弈分析

分析影响三者策略行为的作用因素,构建区域林业碳汇市场的演化博弈模型。在此基础上,结合系统动力学理论,对广东省的碳汇发展状况进行仿真模拟,找出影响市场均衡发展的关键因素。结果表明:政府部门趋向于选择投入策略,其中提高市场碳交易额对拉动市场需求有显著影响,而增强对林农碳汇林的补贴力度难以解决市场当前供需问题。     

基于Moran过程的PPP项目承包商机会主义行为演化动态

在PPP项目中，由于政府部门和承包商的目标不一致以及信息不对称等原因的存在，使得在其全寿命周期过程中，承包商的机会主义行为屡见不鲜。本文基于随机演化博弈理论，建构基于Moran过程的博弈模型，旨在探讨推动PPP项目承包商不采取机会主义行为策略的有利条件。研究表明，承包商数目不断扩大，通过降低承包商之间的举报成本，增大惩处力度，可使降低机会主义行为发生概率的效果显著。进一步，借助数值算例，对研究结果进行验证并给出相应的管理对策。     

An evolutionary Cournot oligopoly model with imitators and perfect foresight best responders

We consider the competition among quantity setting players in a linear evolutionary environment. To set their outputs, players adopt, alternatively, the best response rule having perfect foresight or an imitative rule. Players are allowed to change their behavior through an evolutionary mechanism according to which the rule with better performance will attract more followers. The relevant stationary state of the model describes a scenario where players produce at the Cournot‐Nash level. Due to the presence of imitative behavior, we find that the number of players and implementation costs, needed to the best response exploitation, have an ambiguous role in determining the stability properties of the equilibrium and double stability thresholds can be observed. Differently, the role of the intensity of choice, representing the evolutionary propensity to switch to the most profitable rule, has a destabilizing role, in line with the common occurrence in evolutionary models. The global analysis of the model reveals that increasing values of the intensity of choice parameter determine increasing dynamic complexities for the internal attractor representing a population where both decision mechanisms coexist.     

信息技术产业创新发展的演化复杂路径研究

信息技术产业创新发展的研究具有现实意义。通过文献研究建立信息技术产业创新演化复杂系统研究框架，汇总认知角度的创新层次、产业演化以及演化研究工具和方法等相关研究情况，认为应重视动态、演化和复杂系统的特点，政府介入推动自组织网络的高效率演化和发展，促进网络化学习，避免低端依赖，促进创新效率。创新系统研究应包含认知领域的相关成果，利用演化计算和机器学习方法构建模型，提升对真实行为的模拟仿真和解释能力。     

产业技术创新联盟信息共享决策研究——基于区块链技术的应用

将区块链技术应用于产业技术创新联盟信息共享领域,可解决联盟信息共享安全问题,提高联盟主体信息共享意愿,加深信息共享程度,进而提升联盟信息共享效率。使用演化博弈方法,构建产业技术创新联盟企业和学研两方的信息共享博弈模型,并通过Matlab仿真对影响双方信息共享决策的政府与区块奖励、惩罚力度、边际成本、风险系数5项因素的影响结果与演化逻辑进行具体分析。结果表明,与传统产业技术创新联盟信息共享过程相比,区块链技术的应用对其共享过程中的各项因素的关键参数值产生了较大影响,更容易推动双方实现均共享的理想均衡状态,但各因素的影响程度不同。有条件的联盟应致力于区块链技术与联盟信息共享网络的融合工作,根据实际情况制定合适的因素组合协同策略,促进联盟的可持续高速发展。     

The Narrow and Broad Approaches to Evolutionary Modeling in Economics

Some models in evolutionary economics rely on direct analogies to genetic evolution, assuming a population of firms with routines, technologies, and strategies on which forces of diversity generation and selection act. This narrow conception can build upon previous findings from evolutionary biology. Broader concepts of evolution allow many or just one adaptive entity, instead of necessarily requiring a population. Thus, an institution or a society can also be understood as an evolutionary entity. Both the narrow and broad approaches have been extensively used in the literature, albeit in different literature traditions. I provide an overview of the conception and development of both approaches to evolutionary modeling, and argue that a generalization is needed to realize the full potential of evolutionary modeling.     

重大水利工程项目决策社会稳定风险评估中的公众参与博弈

为改善重大水利工程项目决策社会稳定风险评估中公众参与现状,从社会稳定风险评估3个主要利益主体——中央政府、地方政府与公众不同的利益诉求出发,运用演化博弈模型,探讨在不同利益诉求的相互作用下影响地方政府与公众在社会稳定风险评估中策略选择的因素。研究发现,当公众受到的损失大于参与付出的成本时,双方稳定均衡状态均表现积极,反之,双方可能均表现为消极或积极这两种截然不同的状态。基于此,分析了中央政府对地方政府和公众在社会稳定风险评估博弈中策略选择的影响。最后,提出应加大对地方政府的支持、规范公众参与相关制度、加大教育培训及宣传力度、创新公众参与方式几项政策建议。     

基于模糊相似优先比法的高校教学团队成员选择

一个稳定的高校教学团队既可以增加成员的凝聚力,也可以帮助团队成员多出教学成果,提高教学质量。但是如何选择合适的团队成员一直是高校教学团队构建过程中所面临的的一个难题。本文运用模糊相似优先比法对某个教学单位中成员进行识别,在此基础上选择适合于组建教学团队的成员。研究结果表明,该方法适合于团队工作成员的有效识别工作,为团队组建者的教学团队组建提供了一种有效的方法。